I very much appreciate Stephen Downes’ response to my posting, and I encourage you to read not only his posting, but several other comments on his posting that followed.
Some of the points I would otherwise have raised in this posting are discussed in these other posts, so here I just want to focus on where Stephen and I agree and where we don’t, because I feel that he has in one or two places confused what people I was quoting said with my own views. Also, my own views wobble to some extent as we discuss the issue more!
First, I think Stephen and I agree that there are many different forms of knowledge, and depending on the context, each form of knowledge may have value. However, I don’t believe the distinction between ‘academic’ knowledge and ‘applied’ knowledge is particularly useful. What is useful is a distinction between academic and non-academic knowledge, as measured by the values or propositions that underpin each kind of knowledge.
Nor do I believe that academic knowledge IS ‘pure’ or timeless or objectively ‘true’. It is the principles or values that drive academic knowledge that are important. It AIMS for deep understanding, general principles, empirically-based theories, timelessness, etc., but I think most academics would agree that knowledge is dynamic, changing and constantly evolving. (My criticism of a lot of science teaching is that it over-emphasises ‘facts’ or content, and under-emphasises scientific method and values). Academic knowledge is not perfect, but does have value because of the standards it requires. Nor do I think academic knowledge or methods have run out of steam. We see evidence all around us that suggests academic knowledge is generating new drug treatments, new understandings of climate change, and yes, better technology, and certainly new knowledge.
I also agree with Stephen that knowledge is not just ‘stuff’, as Jane Gilbert puts it, but is dynamic. However, I also believe that knowledge is also not just ‘flow’. Content or ‘stuff’ does matter as well as the discussions or interpretations we have about content. Where does the ‘stuff’ come from that ebbs and flows over the discussions on the internet? It may not originate or end in the heads of individuals, but it certainly flows though them, where it is interpreted and transformed. Here we get into the differences between learning, thinking and knowledge. Knowledge may be dynamic and changing, but at some point each person does settle, if only for a brief time, on what they think knowledge to be. At this point it does become ‘stuff’ or content. I still contend then that ‘stuff’ or content does matter, though recognising that what we do with the stuff is even more important.
One clarification I would like to make (here’s a wobble) is that I do agree that one way knowledge is changing is in the way it is represented, as Lindsay Jordan says in her comment to Stephen’s response. In the end, this is likely to result in a shift in knowledge that may be very important, and it is in this area where I think Stephen and I may have some agreement. It should be remembered that Socrates criticised writing because it could not lead to ‘true’ knowledge which came only from verbal dialogue and oratory. Writing however is important because it provides a permanent record of knowledge. The printing press was important because it enabled the written word to spread to many more people. As a consequence, scholars could challenge and better interpret, through reflection, what others had written, and more accurately and carefully argue their own positions. Many scholars believe that one consequence of this was the Renaissance and the age of enlightenment, and modern academia consequently came to depend very heavily on the print medium.
Now we have other ways to record and transmit knowledge that can be studied and reflected upon, such as video, audio, animations, and graphics, and the Internet does expand enormously the speed and range by which these representations of knowledge can be transmitted. Maybe this will eventually lead to a ‘knowledge revolution’ equivalent to the age of enlightenment. But I do not believe we are there yet, for the following reasons.
My concern about much of the discussion of the ‘new’ knowledge is that it seems to depend on what I might call majority voting – it is the number of hits that matter, not the quality of the content. Now let me qualify what I am going to write by stating that I realise the limitations of expertise. Experts can and do make mistakes as we have seen from the tragic case of Dr. Smith, the Ontario pathologist, whose mistakes caused many people to go unjustifiably to prison. Experts do need to be always challenged. Nevertheless in many areas of life I prefer to trust in expertise that has been externally tested and validated to someone who just believes that they are an expert. I do not think that testing and expertise comes about because a lot of people visit their web site, for instance. Because Al-Quaida’s web site gets a lot of hits, does it make them ‘right’?
To say that knowledge is driving parts of the economy may be a functional view of knowledge, but it doesn’t necessarily define the type of knowledge, as Stephen argues. Indeed, I argued that several different types of knowledge were driving the economy, not just academic knowledge. I would include what Stephen defines as ‘new’ knowledge, resulting from recent developments over the Internet such as search engines. This may or may not be ontologically different from other kinds of knowledge. My concern is whether this kind of knowledge, described variously as crowd (or cloud) or networked behaviour, provides a form of knowledge that we can trust or can act on. It may or may not, but I would like to see more evidence, more research, using the traditional academic values of rigour, objectivity, and measurement. I suspect that the answer will depend on the quality of the content and the level or standard of discussion that flows through. Until then, I’m sticking with my position that valid and reliable new forms of knowledge are not yet present – but they may be emerging.
Lastly, Stephen was puzzled as to why I felt a blog was not the best way to discuss this issue. What I feel the topic needs is more space and time, and a critique from philosophers would also add to the discussion, I am sure, because I do not have specialist knowledge or training in epistemology. I would like to have had more time to review other writers on this topic, and more space to elaborate my views. I feel that I could do a better job that way. It was not because I needed the discussion to be academically reviewed in the way that journals are reviewed, and indeed, if it was, I doubt if it would be published. So you don’t have to believe what I say, because I’m not an expert on this topic – and even if I were, you should be challenging me!
Dr. Tony Bates is the author of eleven books in the field of online learning and distance education. He has provided consulting services specializing in training in the planning and management of online learning and distance education, working with over 40 organizations in 25 countries. Tony is a Research Associate with Contact North | Contact Nord, Ontario’s Distance Education & Training Network.
Also posted here: http://halfanhour.blogspot.com/2009/03/more-on-new-knowledge.html
You say > However, I don’t believe the distinction between ‘academic’ knowledge and ‘applied’ knowledge is particularly useful.
Here we agree.
You say > What is useful is a distinction between academic and non-academic knowledge, as measured by the values or propositions that underpin each kind of knowledge.
Here we disagree.
First, I’m not sure you can made the distinction stick.
Second, even if you make the distinction stick, then so much the worse for academic knowledge, because the values or propositions that underpin academic method are unsound.
You say academic method > AIMS for deep understanding, general principles, empirically-based theories, timelessness, etc
Yes. But it shouldn’t. That’s my point.
You say > Academic knowledge is not perfect, but does have value because of the standards it requires.
This is a statement deserving of more discussion, because I think that either academics have lost track of the standards, being devoted to process over rigor, or that the standards adhered are in fact no guarantor of worthwhile results.
You say > I also agree with Stephen that knowledge is not just ’stuff’, as Jane Gilbert puts it, but is dynamic. However, I also believe that knowledge is also not just ‘flow’.
It is neither ‘stuff’ nor ‘flow’, in my view. I explicitly reject both views in my post and in the comment that follows.
As I wrote:
“The central tenet of emergence theory is that even if stuff flows from entity to entity, that stuff is not knowledge; knowledge, rather, is something that ’emerges’ from the activity of the system as a whole.
“This network – and subnets with the network (aka ‘patterns of connectivity’) – may be depicted as knowledge…
“A second way of representing knowledge, and one that I embrace in addition to the first for a variety of reasons, is that patterns of connectivity can be recognized or interpreted as salient by a perceiver.”
The reason why this depiction is important is that knowledge, on this view, is *not* “deep understanding, general principles, empirically-based theories, timelessness, etc.”
So whatever it is that academic method is aiming for, it is not knowledge.
This is a key point of contention between us:
You write > at some point each person does settle, if only for a brief time, on what they think knowledge to be. At this point it does become ’stuff’ or content. I still contend then that ’stuff’ or content does matter, though recognising that what we do with the stuff is even more important.
I disagree with.
I do describe (following o0thers) ‘settling mechanisms’ in the brain. We can say that we ‘settle’. We can hypothesize, at least, a (thermodynamically) stable state of connections and activations in the brain.
But the ‘entities’ in such a system (if we can call them that) that constitute ‘knowledge’ do NOT have the properties of ‘stuff’ or ‘content’. This is the key and fundamental point of my argument:
Not ‘stuff’ – not discrete, not localized, not atomic
Not ‘content’ – not semantical, not propositional, not symbolic
And that’s my problem with academic method. It seeks out specifically propositions – symbolic or semantical – that are discrete, localized and atomic. Things that are _candidates_ for deep understanding, general principles, empirically-based theories, timelessness.
I think that maybe if we can untangle the vocabulary we might come to agreement on this. After all,
You say > this is likely to result in a shift in knowledge that may be very important, and it is in this area where I think Stephen and I may have some agreement.
This encourages me.
Skipping ahead quite a bit…
You write > My concern about much of the discussion of the ‘new’ knowledge is that it seems to depend on what I might call majority voting – it is the number of hits that matter, not the quality of the content.
Quite so.
Voting – and counting generally – record only the mass of a thing. They require some sort of identity (in order to identify that which is being counted).
This is distinct from the type of knowlecdge I have been trying to describe, which depends not on the quantity of things assembled, but on the way those things are interconnected.
This is what I have tried to clarify with the distinction between ‘groups’ and ‘networks’. http://www.downes.ca/post/42521
The properties found in the group are (to my way of seeing) just those embraced by what we have been calling the academic method. If you look at the diagram http://www.flickr.com/photos/stephen_downes/252157734/ you see typical academic values: unity (of purpose, of workers, of science), coordination, closed systems, distributive (expert-based) knowledge.
Knowledge based on networks is not based on counting – not on votes, on surveys, on mass, on category or type, etc. because knowledge is not the sort of thing that can be counted, not the sort of thing that can be generalized (as a mass).
The objection to voting *is* an objection to academic method.
The new knowledge is precisely *not* knowledge by counting, knowledge by popularity.
But it’s not knowledge by experts ether. Because if we say that knowledge is based on experts and expertise, then we are saying that knowledge is the ‘stuff’ that’s in people’s heads that goes from place to place. Which – again – it isn’t.
Now it is reasonable to disagree with my position on knowledge, but it’s important to recognize that ‘network knowledge’ isn’t based on counting or popularity – no matter how much this is emphasized by the (popular) media.
Finally,
> Lastly, Stephen was puzzled as to why I felt a blog was not the best way to discuss this issue. What I feel the topic needs is more space and time, and a critique from philosophers would also add to the discussion, I am sure, because I do not have specialist knowledge or training in epistemology. I would like to have had more time to review other writers on this topic, and more space to elaborate my views. I feel that I could do a better job that way.
Well – take all the time and spce you need. Neither are in short supply on blogs.
Indeed – and this is one thing I like – you can go back over again, return to the same point again, attack it from various angles – a whole range of things you can’t really strive for in any other forum.
> It was not because I needed the discussion to be academically reviewed in the way that journals are reviewed
Good. because if we were restricted by reviewers, we could never be having this discussion. Which would be a pity.
Hi Tony 🙂
Again, I really enjoyed this – it offers so much to think about but is still very readable – which always helps with getting the brain around this stuff! I found particularly interesting what you wrote about ‘majority voting’. The concept of a constantly shifting, always expanding multi-dimensional, multi-media web of knowledge is very exciting, and the idea that the ‘truth’ is becoming a product of a universal democracy is also exciting – but also slightly frightening. My immediate instinct is to agree with you that traditional academic values and processes still have their place.
I suspect that this issue is very close to the heart of the debate – how comfortable one feels with the concept of a knowledge democracy…? I actually think that wherever one sits on the scale, we can all muddle along together and benefit from each others’ methods, beliefs and fears 🙂
(Sorry for mixing you up with your son earlier btw)
Stephen: “I think that maybe if we can untangle the vocabulary we might come to agreement on this.”
Exactly! The drift that’s going on in the meaning of ‘knowledge’ in this exchange… I don’t even know where to begin. At this point, I mean following this dialogue, I don’t even know what ‘knowledge’ is anymore. (help)
Stephen: “Because if we say that knowledge is based on experts and expertise, then we are saying that knowledge is the ‘stuff’ that’s in people’s heads that goes from place to place. Which – again – it isn’t.”
This doesn’t necessarily follow. I mean it seems as if you’re saying (in some of your usages, like I said drift) that ‘stored information’ is knowledge. If the information that is stored is based on (filtered through) experts, then knowledge (stored information) has a legitimated quality, and is still, in this usage as stored information, quite disembodied. But somehow I don’t think this is what you’re saying. Are you saying that knowledge can be disembodied? That knowledge can somehow be disconnected from the ability to know?
When you (Stephen) say,
“But the ‘entities’ in such a system (if we can call them that) that constitute ‘knowledge’ do NOT have the properties of ‘stuff’ or ‘content’. This is the key and fundamental point of my argument:
Not ‘stuff’ – not discrete, not localized, not atomic
Not ‘content’ – not semantical, not propositional, not symbolic”
Are you referring to a psychic system? Is it possible that the entities that constitute knowledge can exist outside a body? You can probably see I understand knowledge as embodied (existing in a human body).
I guess these are my questions. Can knowledge exist outside the body? Is knowledge metaphysical? Does a book know? I can answer these questions, but it seems that we would answer them differently.
This is a statement deserving of more discussion, because I think that either academics have lost track of the standards, being devoted to process over rigor, or that the standards adhered are in fact no guarantor of worthwhile results.
I am glad Stephen pointed this out. What academic standards are and why and how they are used needs to be at a minimum revisited, in my opinion.
I think they are as much as anything used to sustain power and prestige in a societal model that has grown into a dependency on institutions. Institutions predominate and operate on position (in the society) and privilege. I am not an expert but was deeply involved in the organizational effectiveness domain for quite a while, and I am not reluctant to suggest that most academic institutions would / do fare very poorly on any acceptable general measures of organizational effectiveness. They are effectively oligopolies, funded by the most part from a societies tax base (tho’ less and less so these days in North America).
We could probably argue about my next assertion for a long time, but if I were a younger person going to university, I think I’d rather study at an “average” European university than an “average” American university these days.
I don’t think Stephen and I are going to agree on the value of academic knowledge. However, I do agree that there is a useful distinction that Stephen makes between groups and networks, although I don’t agree with the necessarily perjorative terms used about groups. Both groups and networks have their value, and each also can operate in ways that neither Stephen nor I would like. Thus I think there is a danger in labelling here (groups bad, networks good) without looking carefully at how different groups and different networks function, and what their purpose is.
While networks are defined by how the ‘nodes’ connect together, their value will depend on what happens across the network, and the nodes are a critical part of determining what happens. If we are talking about knowledge, the nodes will often (but not necessarily) be people, and people will be sharing, contributing and developing knowledge across the network. Moreover, all kinds of knowledge will be going across different network configurations.
To come to the crux of my argument, academic knowledge is rapidly enhanced and expanded by electronic networks, but it is still dependent, in most cases, on people going through some form of educational process that focuses on the standards and ways of thinking that are associated with academic knowledge. Stephen may not be interested in this form of knowledge, but I am, because it has in my view proved extremely useful, and continues to be useful. There are other networks that operate on other areas of interest (such as disgusting food – see The Sneeze – Half zine. Half blog. Half not good with fractions: http://www.thesneeze.com/mt-archives/cat_steve_dont_eat_it.php), which in turn may create or construct knowledge, but it is not academic knowledge. Note that that once people in a network identify a common area of interest, they then de facto become a group focused around that interest.
The argument (I think) is whether education can be better done through unstructured electronic networking alone, through more structured methods, such as group work either in a face-to-face context or online, or through a combination of both structured and unstructured learning environments. I believe there are various ways in which academic knowledge can be developed, but the most effective way seems to me to be a combination of structured and unstructured activities.
Where I do agree with Stephen is that we do not necessarily need the old structures of education based on physical classes or groups. We can achieve many of the purposes of education without the need for continuous and ongoing physical presence. However, groups do have their uses, in that they can provide structure and support that facilitates academic learning. Groups can operate equally well online as well as physically, for educational purposes. The freedom and serendipity of electronic networks though can add immense value to the development of academic knowledge, but only if those contributing to the network share or learn the values of academic knowledge. (I am not disputing that other forms of valuable knowledge can be created by random networks without this necessity – my focus here is on academic knowledge).
Lastly, I have to say I find myself amused that I am defending academic knowledge, but I don’t want to confuse ‘knowledge’ with ‘education’. Like Stephen, I believe that we have gone terribly wrong with our system of education, but it is not the principles of academic knowledge per se that I think are the problem. Yes, we have focused too much on academic knowledge in schools, given it too strong an emphasis, but even within the field of academic knowledge, we have focused too much on content (as measured by standardized testing), and not enough on learning processes, such as critical thinking, problem solving, and the values and principles of academic knowledge. But in moving to new methods and approaches, and the use of new technologies, we should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water – even if Stephen doesn’t like the baby.
[…] This is also posted as a comment to: Bates and Downes on new knowledge: Round 3 […]
I agree with Jon Husband that institutions have come to ‘own’ academic knowledge, partly because they have the power of accreditation, and now the protection and growth of that power has become an end in itself for these institutions. Furthermore, it requires a brave man or woman to challenge that power base.
With regard to whether European universities are better or worse than North American ones, I think it is less a matter of location, and more to do with size, age and prestige. There is very little incentive for the large, prestigious research universities to change, other than funding crises, which is probably the least constructive way to bring about change. These institutions are so embedded within the dominant cultural and economic elites that they are in a self-perpetuating cycle.
Nevertheless I feel we do need major changes to our post-secondary education systems, but to some extent technology (and also students) will drive such changes.
Where changes are likely to happen is round the ‘periphery’ of post-secondary education: for-profit institutions, new institutions, and those currently with low prestige, looking for a new way to recreate themselves.
The so called knowledge society is defined by rejecting the former definition of knowledge. That means that the difference between proven and non-proven knowledge disappears.
Some believe that the ‘crowd’ will define what knowledge and what truth is. But academic knowledge is more than only an agreement between different people which meet on the Internet or wherever.
Academic knowledge is built and constructed by using defined and proven methods. It has also been accepted by the scientific community and must be evaluated or replicated. That is the difference with commonsense knowledge.
The main problem is not the beliefs of the Internet-Society members; the main problem is that scientific knowledge becomes more and more sophisticated. Scientific knowledge, as for example quantum mechanics, is far away form our thoughts in ordinary life.
Modern scientific knowledge started with the idea that the earth is running round the sun and not vice versa, as people believed before. This truth does not fit with our ordinary observation. But this observation has the status of commonsense knowledge and is part of the knowledge society. So it’s not knowledge that this society defines, the definition labels a sample of communicated beliefs which we like to accept.
Burkhard Lehmann, Universität Kaiserslautern, Germany